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Abstract 
No doubt, corruption is one of Nigeria’s biggest socio-political and economic problems today.  
This paper takes a look at the emerging trend of political corruption in Nigeria which is Corruption 
With Tribal Marks. Using Peter Ekeh’s conception of the “Two Publics” in Africa, the author 
argues it will be difficult to fight corruption with the present trend it is taking. The study also looks 
at the nature of the Nigerian state (colonial and post-colonial) and the instrument(s) through 
which it promotes political corruption. The paper also cites recent cases of corrupt politicians in 
Nigeria using Chinua Achebe’s work, A Man of the People. The paper further argues that de-
ethnicization of corruption in Nigeria will take more than just a political process, but 
psychological and socialisation processes.   
Keywords: corruption with tribal marks, tribalism, post-colonial states, political corruption and 
ethnicization of corruption. 
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Introduction 
Nigeria is one of the legacies of British imperialism in Africa. The country’s multi-ethnic nature 
will provide the key to understanding its political problems. Since its independence in 1960, one 
of the main scourges that have bedevilled the Nigerian state is the pervasive nature of corruption. 
It is because of this that scholars have, at different times, devote considerable studies to the 
understanding and explanations of perhaps Nigeria’s biggest socio-political problem. The problem 
of political corruption has taken several dimensions at various times and varying degrees.  
Scholars of different ideological and intellectual orientations have disagreed on the causes of 
corruption. Some see it as a social problem which is a product of social changes that takes place 
in human societies (Olurode, 2005a). Others see it as a universal problem which comes with its 
Nigerian peculiarities (Anifowose, 2005). Corruption has always been explained with little or no 
attention to the emerging dimension it is taking in ethnic form. 
The structuralists have maintained that the Nigerian post-colonial state failed to advance real 
development programmes because the state is largely controlled by a political class which is only 
interested in capturing state resources through the instrumentality of political power. Because the 
political class lacks imagination, initiative and creativity, this has led to the failure of critical 
institutions like the public service to deliver welfare services to the people (Ake, 1981). Others 
have contended that corruption in Nigeria is due to Nigeria’s contacts with Britain (Ekeh, 1975; 
Beckman, 1985).  
The primary purpose of this paper is to unearth the roots of corruption in Nigerian state in its proper 
form. The paper will be interrogating the Nigerian state (colonial and post-colonial) which is 
founded on ethnicity and uses it as a tool to maintain their rule over the masses. The paper also 
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discusses the how the political class benefits from the ethnic composition of Nigeria. The paper 
also discusses how the Nigerian post-colonial state has officially legitimized the ethnicisation of 
corruption.  
With the understanding of the attachment of the people to their ethnic groups, the political class 
has made it difficult to stamp out corruption because ethnicity is used to mobilise the masses 
against the fight against corruption of which the political class hides under the shield of ethnicity 
while continue to loot the nation’s wealth. 
Having identified corruption as a problem in the Nigerian state since its independence, the 
following questions will naturally arise: What are the real cause(s) of political corruption in the 
Nigerian state? Why has it been difficult to stamp out or minimise corruption? What are the 
solutions and explanations to the problem of political corruption in Nigeria?  
Ethnicity: Some Conceptual Notes 
What is ethnicity? Before we conceptualise ethnicity, we must make some important distinctions 
between ethnic groups and tribes. Frazier (1957) sees ethnicity as race or “culture contact”. He 
defines it as “the relations of people, not merely as individuals in their interpersonal interactions, 
but people as mere members of groups, which are differentiated because of both physical 
characteristics and cultural differences.” (p. 31). These “cultural differences” according to Frazier 
includes technology, customs, habits, values and resulting personality organization of the members 
of the various racial and cultural groups (ibid). 
In Frazier’s analysis, we may deduce that ethnicity connotes the following: First, it symbolises a 
form of social interaction among groups of people who share common moral order. Second, it can 
mean (negatively) competition, jealousy, conflicts or ultra-nationalist sentiments which create a 
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siege mentality of “us-versus-them” mentality among groups. He notes: “Since the two parties 
(ethnic groups) in a conflict are not members of a moral order, generally they do not regard each 
other as human. Consequently, there is no basis for human sympathy or opportunity for human 
impulses…” (Ibid). 
In essence, ethnicity may create a sense of brotherhood bond between members of the same 
cultural background brought up by historical affinities in trade, marriages or religious worship; 
they are not necessarily of the same moral order. For instance, an Ijebu man may speak fluent 
Yoruba as (if not more than) an Ibadan man or Egba man. This does not reduce the Ijebuness in 
the Ijebu man neither does it erase the Ibadanness in the Ibadan man or the Egbaness in the Egba 
man because they both speak Yoruba or share the same cultural background (Eleazu, 1977:24). 
However, they will both remember they are both children of Oduduwai when they are dealing or 
negotiating power or economic values with non-Yoruba speaking groups. The Yoruba identity or 
bond between the Ijebu and Ibadan will immediately take the back seat when the issue of Ijebu or 
Ibadan stateii is raised. Soon, the Ijebu man begins to see how different he is from the Egba man 
as though they are not both Yorubas. The Onitsha people in the 1930s refused to be classified with 
others in the eastern region Ibos because they consider themselves superior (Abernethy, 1969 cited 
in Ekeh, 1975).  
With this understanding of ethnicity, we then proceed to dissect the roots of the problem in our 
perspective of the nature of mother day corruption in Nigeria. 
 
 
6 
 
Ethnicity as a Colonial Construct 
Was there ethnicity in Africa before colonialism? 
The most important thing to note about the colonial incursion into Africa is that it was largely 
motivated by economic reasons (Rodney, 1972). In considering the European imperial ambitions, 
it is important to note that political and cultural aspects played the second fiddle to the economic 
aspect (Ejimofor, 1987:31). The Colonial state, an agent of European imperialist interests, was 
purely interested in deploying all means (including every means) to achieve its imperial ambitions. 
One of the chief tools to achieve this was to raise ethnic consciousness out of the existing tribal 
societies through classifications and deliberate policies. 
Before the advent of colonial rule in Africa, Africans belonged to several social groups which 
enhance social harmony. There were groups such as nuclear and extended family, lineage and 
chiefdoms, and perhaps class and tribes (Iliffe, 1979: 318). It is often accepted that pre-colonial 
African identity was not based on ethnic affiliation, but on the clan. Ethnic affiliations are partly 
based on history and mythology which the colonial state capitalized on for political reasons (An-
Na’im and Peshkova, 2000: 78). 
Africa has tribes which related in harmony in trade, marriages and diplomacy. These tribes have 
developed a high degree of social and political organization which the colonial state violently 
disrupted and inverted to further the imperial ambitions of the European capitalists (Frazier, 1957; 
Iliffe, 1979; Rodney, 1972).  
Since these tribes were almost never in conflicts with each other, the colonial state took advantage 
of the simple misunderstandings among the local tribes to create identities and loyalties which the 
newly-formed state felt comfortable with. The states of Africa now made Africans think 
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themselves as being Yorubas, Igbos, Muslims, Catholics, Christians to enable them to function 
effectively within the colonial framework because the metropolitan bourgeoisies wrongly thought 
Africans belonged to the ethnic groups they help create (Iliffe, 1979). 
The colonial state in its poor understanding of ethnicity among Africans developed policies to 
institutionalise ethnicity. Policies like the indirect rule, assimilation or “divide and conquer” in 
their bid to achieve “administrative efficiency” (Iliffe, 1979). With policies like indirect rule, an 
African soon began to see how different he is from a fellow African who doesn’t speak his tribal 
language; stopped seeing his brother’s skin colour as something that should unite them; ceases to 
see the historical affinity he has with his other tribes. Rather, he now remembers long-forgotten 
disagreements his ancestors had with his brother’s over a land issue which the colonial state 
brought up again. In essence, he now sees the white officer as a master, a messiah and a Lord that 
will help him avenge old treatments. All these are to the pleasure of the colonial state. This was 
one way the colonial state was able to exert its hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). The hegemony the 
colonialist created was based on domination, oppression, repression, exploitation, injustice and 
illegitimacy (Nnoli, 2010:62). 
A cursory look at the Nigerian history reveals a deliberate attempt by the colonial state to 
institutionalise divisive ethnic tendencies in the country. In 1914, despite Lord Lugard’s 
amalgamation of the Colony of Lagos, the protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, 
each continued to be governed separately. Each had its colonial bureaucracy with different official 
languages. In 1939, the country was divided into three: North, West and East each having its own 
Lieutenant Governor who was responsible to the Governor-General in Lagos with substantial 
political powers devolved to these regions (Osuntokun, 1979). 
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The colonial state fostered ethnicity by encouraging the rise of ethnic consciousness among 
Nigerians. To prevent the masses from uniting effectively against the colonial state, they spread 
myths about how different the existing tribes were from one another. They achieved these 
successfully by enlisting the help of domestic agents of the colonial state-the petty bourgeoisies. 
They equally adopted several strategies which includes, but not limited to: 
i. Classifying ethnic groups and insisting that official forms carry information about the 
ethnic origin of individuals, 
ii. Disaggregating ethnic groups into various subgroups, 
iii. Favouring some ethnic groups over others, 
iv. In some cases, they separated already assimilated groups (Nnoli, 1986: 16)  
After the successful creation and institutionalization of ethnicity, the colonial state used the petty 
bourgeoisies optimally in this role. With the division of the country into three regions, the petty 
bourgeoisies saw the opportunity to agitate for more representation in the Legislative Council 
whose membership was only limited to Lagos and Calabar. They raised their voices loud in their 
call for a federal system of government which guarantees the security of their positions under the 
new Richards’ Constitution of 1946 (Nnoli, 2010: 67).  
When it was obvious the indirect rule policy has all but succeeded in several parts of the country, 
especially in the South, the colonial state declared it illegal. In its place, it gave the petty 
bourgeoisies the opportunity to finally displace their arch rivals, the traditional rulers, in the 
colonial administration. The petty bourgeoisies have gotten what they have all their lives longed 
for- the official recognition of the colonial state as representatives of the people. They were granted 
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juicy positions in the newly Africanized Civil Service and had the opportunity to rub shoulders 
with the colonial officials (Coleman, 1958).  
The colonial state encouraged the petty bourgeoisies to form political parties along ethnic lines 
(Sklar, 1963). The petty bourgeoisies who lacked the privilege of access to colonial officials needs 
political parties to do so. With the political parties based in the regions, the petty bourgeoisies had 
access to state resources for the first time, and the British economic interest was under little threat 
(Post, 1964 cited in Fadakinte, 2013). The colonial state allowed the petty bourgeoisies unhindered 
access to state apparatus; they used their regions as the basis for domination. Hence, they agitations 
for more autonomy grew louder. 
The 1951 Constitution perfected the ethnicisation of the petty bourgeoisies as it created regions 
which it divided among the competing petty bourgeoisies to effectively distract them away from 
uniting against the colonial state. They were content with looting of state resources where they 
controlled the state apparatus as was later discovered during the African Continental Bank (ACB) 
and Coker Commission of Inquiryiii involving respectively former Premier of the Eastern Region, 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and former Premier of Western Region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Olurode, 
2005b; Awolowo, 1987). At this juncture, we must note the following points: 
First, the colonial state created and institutionalized ethnicity as a tool to maintain its hegemony. 
Secondly, it created the petty bourgeoisies to build ethnic consciousness among Nigerians in other 
to protect the colonial state. The petty bourgeoisies were only interested in taking over political 
state apparatus after independence from the colonial state, including corruption. While it looked 
like the petty bourgeoisies are divided along ethnic lines, they only use the masses to achieve this 
as a guarantee of the continuous enjoyment of state resources. (Peil, 1976) argues that the Nigerian 
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political elites carry the banner of ethnicity more than the masses in the process, creating ethnic 
camps and hatred with themselves fanning the embers of disunity among the latter as a means of 
guaranteeing their continuous stay in power. In a sense, the political class in Nigeria is only 
capitalizing on Nigeria’s multi-ethnic composition. The elites are often the major beneficiaries 
when the masses are divided along ethnic and racial lines. The political elites will do all it can to 
maintain this division as long as it is in their interests to do so (Olzak, 1989). 
According to Nnoli (2010), the petty bourgeoisies “does not want public office, but privileges; not 
protection, but wealth. They know that they can attain them easily and quickly through increased 
access to public purse. To all intents and purposes…discussions in Nigeria has always been 
dominated by the arguments of these ethnic factions about the most advantageous privileges and 
state jobs for each of them. These are not arguments about empowerment of the people or creation 
of wealth but about jobs, privileges, and opportunities for easy access to governmental 
treasury…In the process of haggling of these benefits, legal and political principles yield to 
political opportunism, national unity to petty empires, and patriotism to mindless reaction” (p.70-
71). The ethnicity the colonial state creation is thereby completed! 
 
Corruption With Tribal Marks: Critiquing Ekeh’s Conception of “Two Publics” 
In his seminal work on the impact of colonialism on African societies and politics, Colonialism 
and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement, Peter Ekeh is of the opinion that the 
dilemma facing Africa today is the dichotomy between what he calls “Two Publics”, one civil and 
the other primordial. Unlike in the West where public realm is one which was created with the 
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Westphalian (modern) state, in Africa colonialism broke the strong communal bond existing 
among tribes and on these, it forcefully created a colonial state.  
According to Ekeh (1975), the three issues that make the two publics dialectically opposed to each 
other are: corruption, voluntary association and tribalism. He associates corruption largely with 
the civil public since corruption is nearly absent in the primordial public. He writes: “The civil 
public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private 
realm and in the primordial public” (p. 92). While the two are said to be dialectically opposed to 
each other on the basis on morality, Ekeh admits that the political actors in the civil public can also 
function simultaneously in the primordial public (p. 93). What could the post-colonial states of 
Africa have done to correct this contradiction immediately after independence? 
There were two options: the first option is to adapt and localize the colonial structures and 
institutions for them to serve as agents of social mobilization and nation building. The second 
option was to use the colonial civil service as a tool for institutionalizing ethnicity just as the 
colonial states did. Nepotism and primordial sentiments became qualifications to gain employment 
into the civil service. The ethnicisation of state institutions like the Military made such institutions 
become political tools to promote ethnicity and corruption. 
Ekeh (1975) argues that corruption “…arises directly from the amorality of the civil public and 
the legitimization of the need to seize largesse from the civil public in other to benefit the 
primordial public” (p. 110). To become clearer on his view on corruption, he divided corruption 
into two: first, embezzlement of public funds and second, is the solicitation and acceptance of 
bribes from individuals seeking services provided by the civic public by those administering these 
services (p. 110). In insulating the primordial corruption, he maintained that “Both carry little 
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moral sanctions and may well receive great moral approbation from members of one’s primordial 
public… these forms of corruption are completely absent in the primordial public.” (p. 110). 
The truth is that while the author must have written about things that happened before 
independence when the primordial public still maintains strong moral values, post-colonial Nigeria 
appears to have been involved in a serious breakdown of values due to social and political changes 
since independence. As Olurode (2005a) opines: “Social change is part of human existence. Where 
social change takes place slowly or on the fringes of the society, it may be unnoticed or 
unproblematic but where it is rapid or occurs at the core, it becomes noticeable. Every society must 
admit social change as a fact of life, but where this is destructive of established social pattern of 
behavior, the change process becomes a source of concern…” (p.1) 
A lot as passed unnoticed about changes in African societies since the “culture contact” with 
Europeans (Frazier, 1957). Since Ekeh wrote the thesis about 40 years ago, Nigeria’s political and 
social landscape has undergone remarkable changes from military rule, state creation, local 
government reforms, civil service reforms, the deciding influence of money in politics and so on 
have their varying effects on erosion of the value system. In an update on Ekeh’s thesis, Onuoha 
(2014) writes on one of the noticeable changes in the Nigerian society citing four different cases 
of how corruption has permeated the primordial public as a result of the breakdown of value 
system. He argued that: “the near clear-cut distinction between the two publics no longer exist in 
Nigeria (Africa)” (Onuoha, 2014: 325). 
In today’s Nigeria, the primordial public, as represented by the traditional rulers and religious 
institutions, who are supposed to be the custodians of culture and values, have been reported to 
have commercialized chieftaincy titles by giving them to the highest bidders. The politicization of 
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Chief’s appointments, partly due to the poor remuneration of the traditional rulers, may have 
contributed to the erosion of values in the institution as it was the case with President Obasanjo’s 
involvement in the Owu chieftaincy affair (Olurode, 2005b). 
Available records in the 1960s show that the primordial public was involved in corruption in 
varying degrees. Chinua Achebe, Nigeria’s foremost novelist, in two of his novelsiv written in the 
period is about the social problem of corruption especially in the Ibo traditional society and 
voluntary associations. For constraints of time and space, we shall not allow the details of the plot 
of the novels to detain us here. In No Longer At Ease, Chinua Achebe wrote of the case of Umuofia 
Progressive Union, a voluntary association or town union, which raised money for Mr. Obi 
Okonkwo (the central character in the novel), to proceed to London for further education but its 
members expect, in return, get Umuofians employed through his influence in the Scholarship 
Commission in the Ministry of Education, where he was secretary. In other to succumb to pressure 
from his kinsmen who overburden him with responsibilities lured him to collect a bribe of 20 
pounds (Taiwo, 1967:140-141). The case of Obi in No Longer At Ease only goes ahead to confirm 
that the new nature of political corruption is its ethnic nature, that is, corruption with tribal marks! 
The Nigerian State and the Legalization of Corruption With Tribal Marks 
With the petty bourgeoisies now firmly in charge of state apparatus immediately after 
independence, they soon divided into factions over which should have the larger share of the 
looting of state resources at the federal level. In other to outdo each other, they resorted to their 
most potent tool- ethnicity, as a means of guaranteeing greater inclusion in their access to state 
resources or the national cake (Nnoli,1996; Okorie and Greg, 2013). The ethnic faction(s) of the 
petty bourgeoisies that feels it wasn’t carried along really do not see much wrong with others since 
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they probably would have done same if they had the opportunity, but they can only do their best 
to be part of the “carry alongv” so as not to lose out totally as we saw in the case of the clash 
between Awolowo and Akintola in 1962vi. The faction that felt totally out of the party began raising 
their voices and the word “marginalization” became the battle cry. Suddenly, every ethnic faction 
of the petty bourgeoisies began to use it in varying degrees of efficacy (Guardian, 1988; Sentinel, 
1994; Nsukka Analyst, 1994, Adedeji, 1993, Ikpeze, 2000) when they felt left out of the party. 
The inability of the state of mediate between the factions among the dominant social class led to 
the 1966 military coup and subsequently the Civil Warvii (Fadakinte, 2013; Siollun, 2009; Achebe, 
2012; Madiebo, 1980). The use of the word “marginalization” by the political class largely portray 
them as a group of political charlatans and ethnic chauvinists who deliberately want state resources 
for their own selfish interests using ethnic appeal (Ikpeze, 2000; Shelby, 1990). 
As a result of this, the increasing voice of the “losing” faction of the petty bourgeoisies became 
louder. Their never-ending cry of “marginalization” arm-twisted the military to get them more 
included in the federal administration with guaranteed appointments in the Cabinet and federal 
boards under the 1979 Constitution in “formalised and institutionalised form” (Agbodike, 1989; 
Afigbo, 1987). This commences the legalization of corruption with tribal marks in the Nigerian 
state. 
The inclusion of federal character into the 1979 constitution is a display of heinous attitude by the 
elite. Since its inclusion and institutionalization under the 1999 Constitution, Nigeria has known 
no peace with the now ethnicization of looting with ignominy by the political class. That Nigeria 
is still united is not unconnected to the elite tie that sacrifices popular agitation for personal gains. 
The raising security challenges orchestrated by militia groups are indications of disillusionment 
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among different ethnic groups and sub-nationalities who feel their representatives among the petty 
bourgeoisies have not “carried along” in the scheme of things in the Nigerian state (Okorie and 
Greg, 2013). 
Agbodike (2003) cited in Okorie and Greg (2013), argued that federal character has been 
instituionalised to serve the overall interest of the petty bourgeoisies ruling class. In a similar 
opinion, Chaturvedi (2006) maintains that elitism represents only the interests of the few 
minorities. Implicit in the above explanations is that those who champion the principle and policies 
are beneficiaries hence it is another form of expanding their corrupt, sodid-political and economic 
empire.  
Shelby (1990) argued that federal character will cultivate ethnic consciousness in other to achieve 
greater economic and political resources by making to “special treatments” from the state or 
society. The salient assumption of the federal character principle as understood by the petty 
bourgeoisies is that whatever resources are looted at the federal level will be trickled down to the 
community. Hence, there will be words like “our money”, “our turn” or “our time” by different 
ethnic groups to partake in the looting (Ibid). 
While some the supporters of the federal character principle insist it has semblance to the United 
States (US) “affirmative action” policy developed in the 1960s to protect the interests of minorities 
and hedge them against “unfair majority preferences in the past” (Macionis, 1992: 294; Adujie, 
2009), the principle seem to make sense to the political class only when political appointments are 
involved. With the background above, we are convinced that, unlike the US “affirmative action” 
which protects minorities against unfair discriminations in paid employment even in the private 
sector, its Nigeria version of what was called “affirmative action” is only about looting the state 
resources with ignominy (Adigun, 2015). Rather, the political class understood federal character 
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to mean ‘appointing a person from any part of Nigeria into a position, that person, first and 
foremost, must “carry his or her ethnic group along” in the scheme of things. Invariably, the 
appointee represents his “constituency”, not necessarily his portfolio(s). It looks more like “just 
get someone to fill in that position, so long as it gives everyone the feeling of inclusion, not so 
much whether they are competent for the position or not.” (Adigun, 2015). 
We must be quick to admit that like many other provisions of the Constitution, the Federal 
Character principle was meant to correct some ethnic imbalances experienced in the First Republic 
but that was not to be. Going by its recent application that it has created more problems than it has 
attempted to solve especially has it has complicated, compromised and distorted the fight against 
corruption. Rather than promote national unity, it has disunited the nation more than before. It has 
become easy these days to invoke “federal character” when politicians are caught involving in 
corrupt acts (Adigun, 2015). Rather than solve the problem of tribalism and ethnicity, the petty 
bourgeoisies have used it effectively to shield themselves from arrest and prosecution for 
corruption they indulge in since they carry their ethnic banners rather than the portfolio they are 
meant to defend. Their local godfathers, who recommended them for appointment in the first 
instance, will help spring up ethnic sentiments to claim their godsons are been persecuted because 
of their ethnic origin (Olurode, 2005a; Okorie and Greg, 2013). Also, rather solve the problem of 
ethnicity, it has widened its scope into corruption effectively completing corruption with tribal 
marks. 
The Nigerian state didn’t stop there. When it became clear that when there were “deliberate 
violations of the…principles of ‘federal character’…by the victorious coalition” (Ikpeze, 
2000:100), the political elite smuggled an enforcing mechanism known as Federal Character 
Commission to monitor strict compliance of the ethnicisation of corruption in the 1999 
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Constitution so that all the ethnic factions of the petty bourgeoisies can be effectively “carried 
along”.  
Under the federal character arrangement, a public officer so-appointed, even if he is caught in acts 
of corruption, his ethnic group or the community (not his portfolio) sees it immediately as 
persecution from other ethnic groups since “our son” is not the only thief “eating from the national 
cake.” In other cases, the state may appeal to the ethnic group or community that the disgraced 
officer will be replaced in the same “juicy office” by one of their own. The disgraced officer then 
gets a plea bargain, and retires quietly after his “brother” has replaced him.viii 
Abba (2003) and Sharma, Sadana and Herpreet (2011) affirmed that politicization of public 
enterprises breeds mediocrity which is destructive and thus contributes significantly to the 
inefficiency of most public organizations since mediocres are more loyal to their godfather because 
they lack competence. They tend to frustrate organizational goals and go unpunished. Utume 
(2003) cited in Okorie and Greg (2013) shares the view stating that there is genuine fear that 
officers, secured by provisions of federal character may begin to act like political representatives 
without paying due attention to their duties. The variation in human and material resources across 
ethnic nationalities is known but competence promotes good governance and in turn reduces the 
tension of ethnic revolt and corrupt tendencies under the guise of ethnicisation. 
To show that the petty bourgeoisies are only interest in the corruption that comes with federal 
character, Section 14 of 1999 Constitution, which contains the disputed federal character principle 
is one of the sections classified under the “Fundamental Objectives and Directives of State Policy”, 
contains for instance, Section 14(2)(b)  which made the primary responsibility of the State the 
welfare and security of the people appears to have been neglected repeatedly by the political class 
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under the guise that all the provisions under the “Fundamental Objectives and Directives of State 
Policy” are normative, hence “not judiciable” that is the State cannot be taken to Court if it fails to 
achieve them. Other sections dealing with welfare are Section 15(3) which states that “The State 
shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power” and those dealing with free university 
education like Section 18(3)(c) which deals with free university education for all Nigerians have 
been criminally neglected by the petty bourgeoisies for more juicy “federal character” provisions 
under the same chapter of the Constitution. 
 
 
Corruption With Tribal Marks: A Man of the People and Two Cases 
In a study of this nature we think it is only appropriate to use, not only fictional examples but also 
real life proven cases of how corruption has taken ethnic dimension in Nigeria. Before we proceed, 
let us make an important point. Ethnicity is the biggest political party in Nigeria today. It has all 
the features of orthodox political parties in their ontological sense. Since Nigerian political parties 
all appear to lack ideologies, one can conveniently win elections by one’s ethnic origin, not on the 
strength of one’s ideas. Also, as in orthodox political parties, one can easily “decamp” from one 
party to another. All that is required is get a well-advertised chieftaincy title or marry deliberately 
for that purpose from the recipient group. In some cases, one starts to praise the group and its 
history; insult other groups to make the group feel good, then, the candidate becomes, “our son” 
even though it is by naturalization. More importantly, it shields one from, or exposes one to 
prosecution from corruption depending on whether one is in the right or wrong groupix. 
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In this section, we shall be looking at Chinua Achebe’s A Man of the People and infuse them into 
two Nigerian former governors (of Bayelsa and Delta respectively) who have both been found 
guilty of corruption-Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha and Chief James Ibori. 
Chief M. A. Nanga in Achebe’s A Man of the People, is a typical West African politician who 
knows how to use his community to his own political advantage. He knows how to use his people 
to protect his corrupt deed. Often he can renovate his village school, Anata Grammar School, just 
to get the Village Council endorsement for the next election because every “…man and every 
woman in Urua…would throw his or her paper for him on the day of election…” (Achebe, 
1966:146). As far as he was concerned, his village doesn’t need cleaner water, but “Why should 
they lose their chance of getting …their share of the national cake?” (ibid). To him, the main issue 
was not about improved infrastructure of the people, even though some of the villagers “has been 
promised water but hadn’t so far seen even one pipe.” (p. 147). All that matter to the politician is 
using his ethnic group to gain access to state resources even though his ethnic group members 
hardly benefit from it.    
Nanga also understands the psychology of human needs. His people will not mind him looting the 
state dry as far he leaves some crumbs for his beloved people to fill their stomachs. Chief Nanga 
also typifies modern Nigerian politicians who knows what he needs to do is be visible in his 
community. He will acquire several traditional titles, build boreholes; employ some people in 
Anata village into government positions, like Odili, and boast loudly with it and become a hero. 
Even though Achebe wrote the wonderful novel in the 1960s, much of its contents are still relevant 
today.  
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Being a smart Nigerian politician, Nanga will run to the same people he looted dry to defend him 
in time of trouble. In doing this, he will play the ethnic card. He will create “us-versus-them” siege 
mentality of “they hate us that is why they are after me”. His people will reply, after been told that 
their son is involved in looting of state treasury: ‘“Let them eat”…’after all when the white men 
used to do all the eating did we commit suicide?’ (Achebe, 1966:156).  What else can you tell a 
man or woman who manages to get his bit of the “national cake” from politicians? How do you 
want to preach to a people who roll out drums to sing and praise a corrupt politician that he loots 
their state resources and that he is only spending crumbs on them? These ones will rather fight and 
die to defend “our son” that hear that he is corrupt. His village chiefs will welcome him back with 
both arms and award him the highest title in the land. “Besides,” Achebe writes, “It may be your 
turn to eat tomorrow. Your son may bring home your share.” (p. 157). This explains the fact that 
breakdown in moral value in the “two publics” dates back to the first republic and that the 
primordial society have since approved of the corruption in the civil public effectively puncturing 
Ekeh’s (1975) conception.  
This happens to be the bitter truth in our country today. Ethnicity is only used as a tool, first by the 
colonial masters and later the post-colonial leaders, to divide the masses and permanently becloud 
their sense of reasoning so as to continue to divert their attentions away from the real issues 
(Adigun, 2016). This is the dilemma we face today, how to treat “men of the people” like Chief 
Nanga! 
Case 1: Chief James Ibori, the man of the Urhobox people 
Let us start with the case of Chief James Ibori which is more recent. On 17 April, 2012, former 
governor of Delta state, James Ibori, was sentenced to 13 years in prison by a Royal Court in 
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London after pleading guilty to charges of money laundering and corruption. The story of the 
drama surrounding his arrest and repatriation to London from Dubai is too well-known and should 
not detain us here. Why was Ibori found guilty of corruption in London for offences some Nigerian 
Courts have “cleared” him over? This question bothers on corruption especially in the Judiciary 
which is beyond the present scope of this paper. In all, the dramatic ethnicisation of the whole 
Ibori saga shows how corruption in Nigeria has taken ethnic dimension. 
It is on record that Oghara people, Ibori’s hometown in Delta state, effectively prevent the arrest 
of Ibori for what they perceived as persecutions of their “illustrious son” in 2007. As though that 
were not enough, there is a strong position among his ethnic group that he is one of the defenders 
of resource control, so that should immune him from corruption trial. 
On his reported release, politicians from his ethnic group praised Ibori to the heavens, treating him 
as a hero of some sorts. The Urhobo Progressive Union (UPU) for instance described his arrest 
and trial as the “evil activities of those who dread his rise and courage in championing” their ethnic 
cause (Vanguard, 2016a). The UPU leader, Chief Joseph Omene, speaking for the group said they 
celebrated Ibori because he “puts the Urhobo nation on the radar of national illumination and 
consciousness (Vanguard, 2016a). 
Another ethnic leader representing Urhobo Nationality Council (UNC), Olorogun Egbo, said: 
“…every well-meaning Urhobo person irrespective of our political divide we are happy about the 
good news of Chief James Ibori …coming home to contribute to the development of Urhoboland” 
(Vanguard, 2016b). The speaker of the Delta state House of Assembly referred to Ibori as the 
“rallying point” of their ethnic group no matter how corrupt he is (Vanguard, 2016b). 
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A critical look at all the reactions and submissions on Ibori from his ethnic group and the wild 
jubilation reported in the news media that greeted Ibori’s release attests to the fact that corruption 
has really taken a dangerous ethic dimension in the country.   
 
Case 2: Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the man of the Ijawxi people 
In the case of Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the former governor was charged, like his Delta 
state counterpart, with looting the state treasury. He was reputed to have looted the sum of $55 
million as governor (Roberts, 2015). Unlike Ibori, he was tried in Nigeria, after escaping 
controversially dressing like a woman from London.  
The BBC website cited by Ajayi (2014) claims "Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, governor of Bayelsa 
State in Nigeria, is charged with money laundering $3.2 million in the UK. Last week he jumped 
bail to return to Nigeria, where he has immunity. He claims he is innocent," His arrest and 
prosecution were soon to be followed back home in Nigeria. He will later be impeached by the 
Bayelsa State House of Assembly and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment.  
According to New York Times, he amassed a fortune in foreign bank accounts, he acquired houses 
in London, California and South Africa and an oil refinery in Ecuador, all while tapping public 
coffers to build an airport in his hometown and an Olympic-size stadium in the state capital, among 
other public projects. 
After serving his jail term in Nigeria, he was pardoned in 2013 by President Goodluck Jonathan, 
who had been his deputy and had succeeded him as governor. The United States Embassy in 
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Nigeria considered the pardon a disappointment (Roberts, 2015). The pardon was granted by a 
fellow Ijaw man, the same ethnic group Alamieyeseigha hails from. 
It is rather unfortunate that Ijaw people have since interpreted Alamieyeseigha’s trial as an anti-
Ijaw campaign led by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba man, and former Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) chairman, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, a Fulani man 
(Vanguard, 2014). There is also a strong sentiment among the ethnic group that he is been tried 
for his strong stance on resource control in the Niger-Delta (Olurode, 2005b: 30) even though there 
is overwhelming evidence against the former governor (Ajayi, 2014). 
In one of his interviews with Vanguard, he said on his corruption trial: “By the grace of God, they 
have even made me more popular. I move freely. I drive myself. I don’t need a retinue of aides 
because my people protect me. You can’t throw stone at me in the Niger delta. It is not possible 
but for His Grace.” He boasted about his popularity even after his trial and conviction for 
corruption when he said: “If you recollect the crowd when I came back, that crowd; it is not only 
Bayelsa people but the whole Niger delta gathered. From Yeneagoa where my helicopter landed 
at the government to Amasoma took 5 hours. Ordinarily, it was 25 minutes journey.” (Vanguard, 
2014). 
 
The two cases above represent how ethnicity has been used to justify political corruption in 
Nigeria. Despite the fact that not many cases of corruption have been proven or conclusive, both 
cases above were proven at different times that both politicians are, in fact, corrupt. But the 
continuous use of ethnicity to justify them by raising ethnic consciousness shows the dangerous 
dimension corruption is taking (Steele, 1990).    
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Recommendations 
Due to its emotional nature, ethnicity is built by a deliberate psychological and socialization 
process. Combining same with corruption, like ethnic conflicts, are often difficult to resolve. This 
is why our recommendations will dwell more on the socialization and psychological de-
ethnicisation process. 
It is on that basis we make the following recommendations: 
We must inculcate values like self-reliance, patriotism, service, humility and others among our 
youths. The state must take the lead in this regard through revision of school curricula, national 
orientation, regimented systems of instruction and the likes through social media and other 
accessible mediums. The recent #ChangeBeginsWithMexii campaign, though a good step, must 
examples of “change” on the part of political leadership for the message to properly sink. In doing 
this, the Nigerian state must be ready at all times to reject mediocrity and celebrate meritocracy as 
a culture. This will be one good way of de-ethnicising corruption. 
The traditional and religious institutions must act as true role models for the society to mirror. The 
glorification of money politics and materialism in granting of Chieftaincy titles, “High” masses in 
Church, accepting of public donations of obviously corrupt persons in the society goes a long way 
in ethnicising corruption because these individuals know they will always mobilise their “people” 
to frustrate arrest and prosecution for corruption having paid their price to their respective 
communities.  
Also, traditional awards need to be given to deserving individuals, not necessarily those who have 
corruptly enriched themselves. Traditional rulers and the Church should publicly reject gifts and 
donations from individuals whose sources of wealth are suspect. 
25 
 
Value clarification is something the nation must consciously involve in if we must de-ethnicise 
corruption. The schools must support groups that promote values like leadership, patriotism and 
hard work. Groups such as Boys’ Scout, Girls’ Guide, War Against Indiscipline (WAI) Brigade 
and the #ChangeBeginsWithMe should be formed in schools and supported by the State and spread 
their messages through social media on the evils of corruption. 
The need for national core values and ideology cannot be over-emphasized in this regard. Nigeria 
needs an ideology to provide, guide and give legitimacy and orientation of policy directions for 
the leadership and the masses (Ogundowole, 1988). Without a strong ideological orientation, no 
nation can develop effectively (ibid: 48). 
Some people may ask, Why ideology? And we reply that a national ideology will: 
i. Guide to cognize problems, relating to real and imagined threats and opportunities-real 
potentials and their correlations; 
ii. Guide and direct strategy and tactics of behavious; 
iii. Guide decisions and enhance the process of attaining necessary information to achieve 
overall societal objectives. (Ogundowole, 1988: 48).  
 
Another area we must begin to look at to de-ethnicise corruption is the issue of compulsory 
national military service for all Nigerians as envisaged by section 220 of the 1999 Constitution. 
This has been a long neglected ideal that needs to be realized as a way of de-ethnicising first the 
Nigerian youths, then of all societal ills in Nigeria.  
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Conclusion 
Our central thesis in this paper is that political corruption in Nigeria has taken an ethnic form. The 
paper maintains that as long as ethnicity continues to play a dominant role in Nigerian politics, so 
long will it be difficult to adequately fight corruption as the two cases we cited in the paper reveals. 
The fact that the state has gone ahead to provide a legal framework for ethnicisation of corruption 
under the guise of federal character principle further compounds the problem which Peter Ekeh 
(1975) didn’t envisage. 
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i
Oduduwa or Oodua is regarded as the progenitor of the Yorubas. Most Yoruba people call themselves Omo Oodua 
(the children of Oodua or Oduduwa).  
 
ii
 The Ijebus have for 40 years been clamouring for Ijebu state to be created out of the Egba-dominated Ogun state. 
The Ibadan state was advocated on the basis of the fact that of all the regional capitals of Nigeria’s three original 
regions (Enugu, Kaduna and Ibadan) two have been given the status of states only Ibadan is yet to be a state in Nigeria. 
 
iii
 For full details on the Coker Inquiry see Awolowo, O (1987) Travails of Democracy and the Rule of Law. Ibadan: 
Evans Brothers (Nigeria) Ltd. 
iv
 Chinua Achebe wrote No Longer At Ease and A Man of the People which shows how the traditional societies have 
become engulfed in corruption of the “civil public”. 
 
v
 The term “carry along” is popular in Nigerian Civil Service when it involves sharing of something, often money or 
something of value. 
 
vi
 The clash between supporters of two Yoruba nationalist leaders, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and S.L. Akintola, both 
leader and deputy leader of the Western Region under the Action Group (AG). The series of disagreements over who 
should make major policy decisions after the former became the Federal Opposition Leader in Lagos and the later 
became the premier of the Region led to series of unrests in the region culminating in the declaration of state of 
emergency in the Region. For more on this see Awolowo, O (1987) Travails of Democracy and the Rule of Law. 
Ibadan: Evans Brothers (Nigeria) Ltd. 
 
vii
 There have been several books written on the causes of the collapse of the First Republic. In Chinua Achebe’s There 
Was a Country he gave a participant observer’s version of those things he can remember during the war. Though the 
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book because controversial after it was alleged that the literary icon was partisan in his views. On the violent nature of 
the Nigerian political class, see Siollun’sOil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966-1976) for an 
excellent “insider’s” analysis of the violent nature of the politicians. For a more balanced account of the civil war, see 
Madiebo’sThe Nigerian Revolution and Biafran War. 
viii
 In many cases in Nigeria, a corrupt officer gets traditional title in his ethnic community to show loyalty and 
appreciation. The community sees it as its responsibility to defend one of their own in government since it will be their 
opportunity to eat from the “national cake”. President Jonathan is on record to have said to Anambrarians after the 
sack of minister of energy, Professor Bath Nnaji, (for conflict of interests) that he will be replaced by someone from 
the same area. He kept this promise. 
 
ix
 All these are from what the writer experienced firsthand as political strategies in Nigeria. For instance, Femi Fani-
Kayode, former Minister of aviation, wrote a provocative article against the Igbos, “The Truth about the Igbos” as an 
All Progressive Congress (APC) member in 2013. When he joined the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) later in 2014 
he soon become a “champion of Igbo cause” after he reportedly divorced his wife and married an Igbo woman. Also, 
President Jonathan stresses his Igbo name, “Azikiwe” (a name he rarely uses save during elections) when he goes for 
campaign in the South-East. President Buhari was given an Igbo name in Aba “Ikechuckwu” (The Lion Killer) during 
the heated 2015 presidential campaign. 
 
x
Urhobo is one of the numerous ethnic groups in Delta state, Nigeria. 
 
xi
 Ijaw is an ethnic group, perhaps the only one, in the oil rich Bayelsa state. The ethnic group spreads across Delta, 
Ondo and Rivers. 
 
xii
 The #ChangeBeginsWithMe is a campaign recently launched by the Federal Government of Nigeria at achieving 
attitudinal changes among the people. It has achieved little result so far. 
